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Brashear: Marijuana Prohibition and the Constitutional Right of Privacy: An

MARIJUANA PROHIBITION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
AN EXAMINATION OF RAVIN v. STATE

INTRODUCTION

As marijuana's use increased during the 1960's, it was inevitable
that the laws prohibiting its possession and use would be attacked as
being unconstitutional.' In substance, all of the theories relied on in
such cases were attempts to articulate in constitutional terms the felt
proposition that there are certain activities which the government cannot
validly reach; that there are substantive limitations on the legislative
power to make all or some uses of marijuana criminal.2
The idea has been expressed in varied forms. Constitutional
objections have been based on a freedom of religion claim that some
uses of marijuana may not be prohibited by a state because they are
essential to the exercise of a bona fide religion.3 It has also been argued
1. Studies indicating the increasing use of marijuana in the late sixties and early
seventies through the sampling of small populations are collected in J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEW PROHIBITION 22-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN]; NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON DRUG

AnUSE, HEW,

MARIJUANA AND

HEALTH, FouRTH

REPORT TO THE

UNITED STATES CONGRESS FROM THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

3, 11-15 (1974). The unreliability of conclusions regarding widespread levels of marijuana use based on these studies has been suggested in Josephson, Trends in Adolescent
Marijuana Use, in DRUG USE: EPIDEMOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 783-87
(E. Josephson & E. Carroll eds. 1974). More definite information shows the number
of state marijuana arrests has risen 1000 percent between 1965 and 1970, from 18,815
to 188,682. NATIONAL COMIMSSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE app., at 612 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FIRsT REPORT].

2. The Constitutional Dimensions of Marihuana Control, in FIRST REPORT, supra
note 1, app. at 1123; Bonnie & Whitebread, The ForbiddenFruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA.
L. REV. 971, 1125 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bonnie & Whitebread]; Soler, Of Cannabis and the Courts: A Critical Examination of Constitutional Challenges to Statutory
MarijuanaProhibitions,6 CONN. L. REv. 601 (1974).
3. No court has found marijuana use to be protected as a religious exercise under
the first amendment. Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 939 (1971). Persons making this argument
rely on People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), which
held that the sacramental use of peyote by the Native American Church was essential
to bona fide worship, and that the state of California had not shown a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the abridgment of the members' freedom of religion. To distinguish Woody courts denying the claim of constitutional protection have used a combi-
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under the equal protection clause that a state may not deal inconsistently
with drugs having similar effects and that it may not treat alike drugs
having different effects without rational bases for such actions. 4 Moreover, the methods which a legislature may use to punish marijuana use

have been said to be restricted by the cruel and unusual punishment
clause to the extent that a penalty must bear a rational relation to a
crime. 5 The inherent limitation of the police power has been urged as a
ground rendering unconstitutional any government regulation of an act
not directly affecting the health, safety and morals of the public.0 Of all
nation of two approaches. Some have found the state's interests in prohibiting marijuana use great enough to outweigh the individual's right to exercise his religion, citing
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which held that the Mormon practice
of polygamy could be prohibited constitutionally. See, e.g., Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d
521 (Tenn.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886 (1973). Many of the same courts also
found that marijuana use was not essential to a bona fide religion, (e.g., United States
v. Kutch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968)), and ruled in favor of the states' power
to regulate marijuana use. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th
Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). See Clark, Religious Aspects
of Psychedelic Drugs, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 86 (1968); Watts, Psychedelics and Religious
Experience, 56 CAL F. L. REv. 74 (1968); Note, Free Exercise: Religion Goes to Pot,
56 CALIF. L. Rv.100 (1968).
4. A number of courts have found that there is a rational basis for classifying
marijuana with opiates. See English v. Miller, 481 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'g 341
F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1972); Warren v. State, 288 So. 2d 817 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973);
People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965). Contra, People v. McCabe, 49
Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878
(1972); State v. Zornes, 78 Wash. 2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970). No case has held that
possession of marijuana cannot be made criminal because possession of alcohol is not.
See Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 1159 (1973).
5. Two arguments have been advanced. One relies on Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) (which held that narcotics addiction could not constitutionally be made
a crime) to argue that marijuana use cannot be penalized consistently with the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. No court has so held. See,
e.g., United States v. Thorne, 325 A.2d 764 (D.C. App. 1974), rev'g sub nom. United
States v. Grady, 42 U.S.L.W. 2629 (Super. Ct. D.C. May 17, 1974). A second approach
based on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (which held that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is not "graduated and proportioned to the offense") has
been applied to marijuana use penalties by a minority of courts to find that such statutes
were unconstitutional because the sentence lengths they required were excessive. See
Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 96 S. Ct.
419 (1975); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972). A majority
of courts have found Weems inapplicable because it dealt with the type rather than the
length of punishment and generally have followed the rule that sentence length cannot
constitute cruel and unusual punishment as long as it is within the limits prescribed by
statute. See Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960); Williams v. State,
476 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Crim. 1972); Note, MarijuanaPossession and the California Constitutional Prohibition of Cruel or Unusual Punishment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1136
(1974).
6. While the argument that the state does not have a legitimate interest in controlling marijuana use has received a great deal of attention from the courts, none have
accepted it. See, e.g., Clark v. Craven, 437 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1971); Raines v. State,
225 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969).
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these attacks the argument that marijuana laws are an unjustified invasion by a state of an individual's right of privacy brings into clearest

focus the idea of a substantive limitation and provides the soundest basis
in constitutional theory for a broad restriction on the exercise of the

7
legislative power.

Until the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Ravin v. State,s no
court had declared a statute outlawing the possession and use of mari-

juana unconstitutional because it impermissibly conflicted with the constitutional right of privacy. Despite a line of decisions that had held

that possession and use of marijuana was not constitutionally protected
under the right of privacy, Ravin should be persuasive authority for
future cases in other jurisdictions. This is true even though Ravin

ostensibly relied on the right of privacy amendment to the Alaska
constitution, a provision not incorporated in most other state constitutions. To properly evaluate Ravin past applications of the right of privacy to marijuana prohibition statutes will be analyzed, following a brief
examination of the foundation and development of the constitutional
right of privacy.
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF PRiVACY

The right of privacy was first recognized as a fundamental, unenumerated limitation on the states' police powers in Griswold v. Connecticut.9 In invalidating a Connecticut statute making criminal the use of

birth control devices, the United States Supreme Court reviewed its past
decisions concerning "those peripheral rights" which limit the reach of

the legislatures and "[w]ithout [which the enumerated] rights would be
less secure.
... 10 and concluded that "specific guarantees in the Bill
7. Generally, the only successful attacks have been those challenging the degree
of legislative action, rather than the fact that the legislature has acted at all. Thus,
these decisions permit regulation of marijuana use if it is done properly, e.g., classified
in a different category from "hard narcotics" and penalized by minimal sentences. However, a finding that marijuana use is protected by the right of privacy would completely
preempt legislative power to prohibit such use within the zone of protection.
8. 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975).
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. 381 U.S. at 482-83. The following examples were offered in support of this
premise: Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964) ("freedom of the entire university
community" predicated on the first amendment); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
462 (1958) ("freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations" based on the first
amendment); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) ("freedom of inquiry,
freedom of thought and freedom to teach" based on the first amendment); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (right "to distribute," "to receive" and "to read"
found in the first amendment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ("right
to educate one's children as one chooses" arising from the first amendment); Meyer v.
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of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. .

.

. Various guarantees create

privacy".11

zones of
The Court suggested that these zones of privacy emanate from the
first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments and establish limits on
the use of governmental power to intrude upon an individual's life. 2

For example, the penumbral rights mapped out by the fourth and fifth
amendments together provide "protection against all government invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life' ,'s which
transcends the specific guarantees of reasonable search and seizure and

due process. And the fourth amendment standing alone adumbrates a
"right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
14
particularly reserved to the people.'
Applying these concepts to the facts of Griswold, the Court found

that the "privacy surrounding the marriage relationship" fell within one
of the protected zones, because the marital association antedated and
was unrelated to public affairs. 5 Furthermore, the protection was not
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right of access to the "spectrum of available knowledge" implied in the first amendment).
11. 381 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted).
12. See id. at 484-85. For the importance of Griswold see Henkin note 15 infra.
13. 381 U.S. at 484, quoting Boyd v. United States, 1,16 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
14. 381 U.S. at 485, quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
15. 381 U.S. at 485. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, did not indicate
which of these amendments he relied on primarily. But he suggested that the right of
marital privacy had a constitutional foundation different from the first amendment right
of association. Unlike the right of association, marital privacy is not a necessary adjunct to a democratic form of government, even though its absence would signal totalitarianism; marital privacy is protected because it is an aspect of life in which the government should not interfere:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree
of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved
in our prior decisions.
381 U.S. at 486.
Justice Goldberg, concurring, found marital privacy to be a right retained by the
people within the meaning of the ninth amendment. Justices White and Harlan also
concurred, finding that Connecticut had denied married persons liberty without due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Despite the lack of agreement on
the theoretical basis for the opinion among the members of the Court, seven of them
found a fundamental, unenumerated right of privacy.
The importance of Griswold was noted in Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
COLUM. L. REV.1410 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Henkin]:
Whatever grade the professors might give to Justice Douglas and others for
their performance in the art of constitutional interpretation, the result is clear:
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limited to the relationship itself, but might also extend to a place
connected with it. Thus, a penumbral right would be violated if the law
permitted "the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives ..... 16 Even though it
dealt wtih an otherwise valid state interest, the statute was ruled unconstitutional because it "swept unnecessarily broadly," invading both of
these protected zones. In two series of cases the Supreme Court has
developed the latent rationale of Griswold, recognizing two related
zones of privacy, locus-related and autonomy-related privacy, which
prohibit state interference with an individual's life absent a compelling
7
state interest.'

A locus-related right of privacy has been held to protect activities

within the home that would otherwise be valid objects of state regulation. The idea that the setting in which a regulated activity occurs may
operate as a limitation on the police power has been applied primarily in
obscenity cases. The doctrine was first established in Stanley v.

9
Georgia"" and was later refined by ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton' and

other recent obscenity cases.20

In Stanley the Court declined an opportunity to reverse Stanley's

conviction for knowing possession of obscene movies in his home on
grounds that well-established search and seizure requirements had been
violated.21 Instead, the decision held that the state could not constitutionally prohibit the possession of obscene materials in the home for
it is no longer necessary to eke out privacy in small pieces as aspects of other
constitutional rights; there is now a ConstitutionalRight of Privacy.
Id. at 1423 (emphasis added).
16. 381 U.S. at 486.
17. The distinction is not merely one of academic interest. Failure to perceive the
difference between the two types of privacy has resulted in incomplete treatment of privacy challenges in several marijuana cases; the resolution of one issue was assumed to
have disposed of the entire question. See text accompanying notes 77-87 infra.
The Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), distinguished the two types of privacy:
The protection afforded by Stanley . . .is restricted to a place, the home.
In contrast, the constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular
place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved.
Id. at 66 n.13 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protectionfor PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973).
18. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
19. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
20. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 35 (1971).
21. 394 U.S. at 569 (Stewart, J.,concurring).
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private use.22 This substantive limitation on the police power was based
on a fundamental right to receive information in the home, emanating
from the first amendment and the twofold right of privacy outlined in
Griswold.23
The Court found that control of private thoughts was not a valid
state interest, even though control of the public dissemination of ideas
"inimical to the public morality" might be. 24 While the state may have
had a valid purpose in enacting the statute, neither of the interests
advanced by the state-the danger of anti-social conduct and the increased difficulty of prohibiting public distribution of obscenity-were
found to be sufficiently compelling to justify the restriction on the
fundamental right to receive ideas in the privacy of the home that the
Georgia obscenity statute authorized. 5 In footnote eleven the Court
indicated that its holding was limited to the facts because of the presence
of first amendment interests:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the
State or Federal Government to make possession of other
items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime.
Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment
rights are26involved in most statutes making mere possession

criminal.

22. Five Justices joined in the majority opinion which rested on this ground. However, three concurring Justices agreed with the result only because search and seizure
requirements had been violated. And Justice Black, concurring, based his opinion exclusively on the first amendment.
23. 394 U.S. at 564-65.
24. 394 U.S. at 566. For example, "the danger that obscene material might fall into
the hands of children . . . or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of
the general public .

. . ."

would be state interests sufficient to justify prohibition of ob-

scene matter in a public context. Id. at 567.
25. Id. at 566-68. The Court observed:
Georgia asserts that exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual
behavior or crimes of sexual violence. There appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion. . . . mhe State may no more prohibit mere possession
of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than
it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead
to the manufacture of homemade spirits ...
.. [The] difficulties of proving an intent to distribute . . . . [do not]
. . . justify infringement of the individual's right to read and observe what he
pleases. Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration
of otherwise valid criminal laws.
Id. (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 568 n.ll.
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Despite this dictum, the Court in subsequent obscenity decisions
has withdrawn Stanley's first amendment underpinnings.2 7

In Paris

Adult Theatre I where it was held that obscene movies in public theaters
were not exempted from state regulation under the right of privacy

found in Stanley, the Court observed:
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment

in itself carried with it a "penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the "privacy of

the home," which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that
"a man's home is his castle."28
Following similar reasoning other decisions have made clear the

principle that the right of privacy does not protect the possession of
obscene material outside the home and that the constitutional protection
given such possession in the home arises not from the nature of the

activity, but as a result of the context in which it occurs. 9 If the cases
subsequent to Stanley were attempting to clarify what they considered to

be a good decision, rather than to implicitly overrule a bad one, then the
27. The retreat was necessary since an extension of Stanley based on a fundamental
right to receive, in effect, would have overruled the Court's position in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), that obscenity is not expression protected by the first
amendment. In order to harmonize Stanley with Roth the Court had to delete Stanley's
first amendment base.
28. 413 U.S. at 66. In United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413
U.S. 123, 126 (1973), the idea was restated: "Stanley depended, not on any First
Amendment right to purchase or possess obscene materials, but on the right to privacy
in the home." (Emphasis added.)
29. These cases indicate that Stanley was not based on autonomy-related privacy.
Thus, the Court has been able to consistently hold that a right to possess pornography
in the home does not give rise to a right to possess it outside of the home. United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-43 (1973) (no right to transport obscene matter in interstate
commerce); United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-29
(1973) (no right to import obscene material for the importer's private use); United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971) (no right to import
obscene matter for commercial purposes); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355
(1971) (no right to distribute obscene materials through the mail).
Furthermore, the language of these cases reveals the Court's understanding that
Stanley was based on a locus-related right of privacy. See United States v. 12,200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973). In United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) the Court
said:
The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home,
just as it protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and education. .. . [Viewing obscene
films in a commercial theater . . . or transporting such films in common carriers in interstate commerce, has no claim to such special consideration. It is
hardly necessary to catalog the myriad activities that may be lawfully conducted within the privacy and confines of the home, but may be prohibited in
public.
Id. at 142-43 (citation and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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effect has been to recognize a locus-related right of privacy that is a
substantive limitation on the states' power to regulate activity within the
home in the absence of a demonstrable compelling state interest.
The other type of privacy foreshadowed in Griswold, autonomyrelated privacy, has been developed through several cases which have
held that the government may not interfere with activities affecting

individuality which are not sufficiently public to justify government
regulation-that there is a fundamental, unenumerated right to make
decisions concerning one's personal life. 0 The Supreme Court explicitly recognized an autonomy-related right of privacy in Roe v. Wade.8'
In Roe it was held that a right of privacy protects a woman's choice
of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and that her decision
could not constitutionally be restricted by a state absent some com-

pelling interest.3 2 Thus, the Texas criminal statutes that prohibited
abortions except for the purpose of saving the life of the mother were
void on their face because they were unconstitutionally vague and

overbroad. However, the Court cautioned that the right of privacy
protects only a limited group of activities: "These decisions [recognizing a constitutional right of privacy] make it clear that only personal
rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' .
cy."

33

are included in this guarantee of personal priva-

Thus far, autonomy-related privacy has been extended only to
30. See notes 34-38 infra and accompanying text; A. Doss & D. Doss, On Morals,
Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAuI L. REv. 395, 410, 414-19 (1971); Note, On
Privacy: ConstitutionalProtection for PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670, 719-43,
760-70 (1973).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. Id. at 153-54. In contrast with the lack of consensus about the theoretical basis
for the Grisvold decision (see note 15 supra), seven Justices in Roe agreed that the right
of privacy arose from the fourteenth amendment, and the decision intimated that the
presence or absence of agreement on this point was of secondary importance:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel
it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
410 U.S. at 153. The Court, rejecting the argument "that the woman's right is absolute
and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way,
and for whatever reason she alone chooses. . . ." found that the state had a compelling
interest in regulating abortions for the purposes of protecting the health of the mother
after the first trimester of pregnancy-when the probability of mortality in normal childbirth becomes greater than the probability of mortality in abortion-and of protecting
potential life after the fetus becomes viable. Id. at 153, 163.
33. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
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protect individual decisions concerning contraception,3 4 education,3 5

clothing and hair length, 36 child rearing

7

and family relationships. 38

The principle established by these cases is that there is a substantive

limitation on governmental power to regulate certain personal activities
which are private in the sense that if left unregulated they effect no

significant public harm when such regulation would deny an individual
meaningful self-control.
THE POLICE POWER AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN JUDICIAL
OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION

REVIEW

The state's authority to prohibit the use and possession of marijuana is derived from the police power-the inherent plenary power of
39
the state to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of society.
The police power is broad but exists only to the extent that a public

benefit results from its exercise.40 Since a legislature could exceed the
inherent limitations of its authority under the police power, due process
has been interpreted as requiring state statutes to be rationally related to
34. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ("freedom of the entire university
community" based on the first amendment); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
("freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought and freedom to teach" based on the first
amendment); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right "to distribute," "to receive" and "to read" found in the first amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (right of access to the "spectrum of available knowledge" implied in the first
amendment).
36. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970) (right of privacy protects high school student's decision to wear long hair).
Contra, Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032
(1972).
37. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ("right to educate one's
children as one chooses" based on the first amendment).
38. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ("fundamental freedom to marry"
protected by the due process clause); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
("private realm of family life which the state cannot enter" recognized in dicta); Norton
v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (right of privacy limits civil service's power
to fire persons for private homosexual conduct); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) (sodomy between consenting adults protected
by the right of privacy). In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (right of
privacy prohibits Immigration and Naturalization Service from denying citizenship for
private homosexual acts). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), affd per curiam, 44 U.S.L.W. 3543 (U.S. March 29, 1976) (sodomy
between consenting adults in the home not protected by right of privacy).
39. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1933); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905); Note, The Police Power in Illinois: The Regulation of Private
Conduct, 1972 U. ILL. L. REv. 158, 159.

40. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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is also extrinsically
a valid police power objective. 4 The police power
42
guarantees.
constitutional
specific
by
limited
Absent a showing that a statute infringes a fundamental right,
courts have deferred to the legislature's role as fact finder when statutes
are attacked as being unconstitutionally violative of substantive due
process. A statute is presumed to be constitutional and the burden of
proof is on the person attacking the statute to show that it is arbitrary or
bears no rational relation to the public welfare.43 This burden is not
met if the state can establish that any public benefit arguably results
44
from the statute.
When an individual is able to show that an exercise of the police
power infringes a fundamental right, the presumption that the statute is
constitutional evaporates. In such a case the burden of proof shifts to
the state to show that the statute "promotes a compelling government
interest"4 5 and "there is no reasonable way to achieve those goals with a
lesser burden on the constitutionally protected activity. ' 46
Recently the traditional two-tiered doctrine of judicial review has
been criticized for its inflexibility. Critics argue that courts considering
the validity of statutes which purportedly infringe nonenumerated constitutional rights are forced to choose between virtually preempting
legislative power without express authority and "[abdicating their] role
as the interpreter[s] of basic constitutional principles." 47 To correct this
dilemma, two versions of an intermediate standard of review have been
advocated. Under the first, no presumption of constitutionality would
attach to the regulation of noncommercial activities; if the state could
show that the regulation in fact furthered legitimate state goals, the
statute would be valid. 48 The second standard would require in addi41. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962), citing Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
42. See notes 45-46 infra and accompanying text.
43. E.g., Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954).
44. E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (applicability of standard limited in dictum to the evaluation of "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions").
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634 (1969).
46. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
47. Nowak, Realizing the Standardsof Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 Gno. L.J. 1071, 1096
(1974); notes 48-49 infra.
48. Id. at 1081-82; Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HR-v. L. REv. 1, 20-24
(1972).
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tion that the state show that its interests in enforcing the statute outweigh those of the individual. 49 Authorities urging the adoption of the

intermediate standard find support in Supreme Court cases which strictly apply the rational relation test."
Establishing that a statute is not rationally related to the public
health, safety, welfare and morals is difficult when the statute is presumed constitutional, since every activity affects those interests to some
extent. In the case of marijuana prohibition, there is a sufficient basis
for finding that such laws arguably protect public interests in at least
two ways and are therefore valid if reviewed under the rational relation
standard. First, marijuana prohibition could be justified by the argument that it directly affects the health of anyone who uses it. Even

though a few courts have found, in other contexts, that the state has no
legitimate interest in preventing individuals from causing themselves
harm,5 1 the majority have found sufficient justification for such laws in
the social detriment that results from individual debilitating acts. 2

Second, prohibition of all marijuana might be justified by the indirect
public detriment it caused in limited instances. Thus, without main49. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and
a Proposal,41 FoRnHAm L. REv.605, 622-631 (1973).
50. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
51. E.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72
(1968).
52. See, e.g., Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), which found the regulation of marijuana to be a valid exercise of the police power:
is to the interest of the state to have strong, robust, healthy citizens, ca"[I]t
pable of self-support, of bearing arms, and of adding to the resources of the
country." Since marijuana, in addition to harming the individual, is a threat
to society as a whole, we have no difficulty in upholding its prohibition by the
state.
Id. at 246.
As a practical matter if this sort of argument is accepted the category of activities
which do not affect society is eliminated and any activity which "lessen[s] the full development of an individual's perfection" may be regulated within the police power. Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 DuKE L.J. 1065, 1070. The problems
that this principle creates are illustrated by a hypothetical used by Oteri & Silvergate,
The Pursuit of Pleasure: Constitutional Dimensions of the Marihuana Problem, 3 SUFFOLK L. REv. 55, 56 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Oteri & Silvergate]. The authors suggest that because there is no limitation placed on the kind of harms that can be used
to justify police power legislation, a state's prohibition of Beethoven's music could be
held constitutional, since a legislature could conclude that the measure was necessary to
avoid the violent reactions that the music caused in some. A rational relation standard
of justification would be applied since listening to Beethoven is not a right fundamental
to the American concept of ordered liberty requiring the state to establish a compelling
interest to justify its infringement. The rational relation standard would be satisfied by
the minute public harms sought to be avoided by the legislature.
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taining that the drug itself affected individuals' health, the state could
argue that the short term loss of motor control that it causes creates a
danger of a person driving while under the influence of the drug and
that this danger justifies complete prohibition. Because in both cases
there is some evidence to support the conclusion that marijuana poses a
public threat and total prohibition is not an irrational way of dealing
with that danger, either argument would validate such a statute.
While present knowledge would not support a finding that prohibition of marijuana in order to protect the public welfare is irrational, it is
questionable whether it would be sufficient to justify such laws under a
standard of review more stringent than the rational relation test. 53 Thus,
the validity of marijuana laws is determined by the burden of proof
required of the state; unless the fundamental right or immediate standards of review are applied to marijuana laws, they will be upheld.
Because courts have largely rejected attempts to show that other established constitutional doctrines require marijuana laws to be subject to a
strict standard of review, 54 the developing constitutional right of privacy
is significant as a possible vehicle for invalidating such laws. If a court
dealing with a privacy attack determined that an aspect of marijuana use
was protected by a zone of privacy, the state would have the burden of
showing that its infringement of the right was the least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling state interest.
PIVACY V. MAMRJUANA PROHIBITION:
THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE CONFLICT

Other than Ravin no court has held that a state could not prohibit
private possession and use of marijuana because a right of privacy would
be violated. Rejection of the privacy argument has taken varied forms,
but no case has given the argument extensive treatment.

In several cases no rationale was given for the conclusion that
marijuana possession is not protected by the right of privacy; these
53. See State v. Baker, - Hawaii -, 525 P.2d 1394, 1402-06 (1975) (Kobayashi,
J., dissenting) (presumption that marijuana prohibition is constitutional rebutted by defendant's evidence that marijuana is not sufficiently harmful to rationally justify the imposition of criminal sanctions for mere possession); State v. Knatner, 53 Hawaii 327, 493
P.2d 306, 313-18 (Levinson, J., dissenting) (state unable to establish compelling interest
justifying prohibition of marijuana for personal use); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91,
194 N.W.2d 878, 879 (1972) (Kavanagh, J., concurring) (state unable to establish compelling interest justifying prohibition of marijuana for personal use); Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 2, at 1152 (state unable to establish rational scientific basis for marijuana legislation).
54. See notes 2-6 supra.
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courts simply held that no right to possess and use marijuana existed
and that the Supreme Court privacy cases were inapplicable. 5 While
little can be said about such an approach, the brevity of the treatment
suggests that these courts not only considered the right of privacy in
general to be somewhat suspect, but also assumed that the argument was
not seriously offered by defendant. This approach is especially surprising since these cases were decided after Griswoldand Stanley.
A similar problem of interpretation is created by cases whose
opinions do not make clear whether the basis of a constitutional attack
can be correctly characterized as the right of privacy.5 6 Typically it is
alleged that marijuana prohibition infringes "personal liberty" or "happiness" and no authority is cited. Understandably the disposition of
such arguments has been no more rigorous than the attack, making it
difficult to determine just what the court decided.
At least one court has handed down a sufficiently explicit opinion
to conclude that its result was based on a misunderstanding of the right
of privacy. In Scott v. United States5 7 defendant appealed his conviction for possession of fertile marijuana seeds, arguing that the District of
Columbia Narcotic Drug Act violated substantive due process. Amicus
curiae argued, inter alia, that the "rights of privacy . . . afforded a
right to the personal use of marijuana. . ... 51 and that the statute was
unconstitutional because it infringed that right. The court affirmed the
conviction because the scant evidence offered by both sides at trial was
"a very slender basis. . . for declaring an Act of Congress unconstitutional. . . ."9 In the absence of evidence to support the allegations of
unconstitutionality, the traditional presumption of rationality was found
sufficient to uphold the statute.
Failing to decide whether marijuana use fell within a zone of
privacy, the court begged the privacy challenge. Its failure was not
justified by the lack of trial evidence, since the scope of a zone of
privacy is a question of law. The court's avoidance of the issue may
have resulted from a confusion of the right of privacy and substantive
due process. Even though the court characterized amicus' theories as
55. See Kreisher v. State, 319 A.2d 31 (Del. 1974); Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d
521 (Tenn.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886 (1973); Miller v. State, 458 S.W.2d 680
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
56. See State v. Deschamps, 105 Ariz. 530, 468 P.2d 383 (1970); People v. Glaser,
238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 880 (1966).
57. 395 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968).
58. Id. at 620.
59. Id.
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"different" from those of the defendant, it apparently felt that the
privacy argument was sufficiently similar to the due process argument
for the rational basis test to be the appropriate litmus of both.
While it is difficult to extract from the language of their opinions the
factors that actually persuade courts, several decisions appear to have
failed to distinguish adequately due process and the right of privacy.00

The courts in those cases took the step omitted by Scott and concluded
that marijuana use and possession were not protected by the right of privacy. However, their refusal to extend the right of privacy was supported by a finding that regulation of marijuana was a proper object of
the police power. Since the question of the applicability of the right of
privacy arises only if an activity is properly regulated under the police
power,6 1 these cases were based at least in part on irrelevant considerations.
60. See, e.g., Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), cert. deniedd, 400 U.S.
808 (1970); State ex reL Scott v. Conaty, 187 S.E.2d 119 (W. Va. 1972). See also
State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 183 N.W.2d 911 (1971) (possession of depressant and
stimulant drugs not protected by right of privacy because the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting the possession of narcotics).
61. The right of privacy is a substantive limitation on the police power. The substantive due process argument makes the distinct assertion that the police power is not
validly exercised in a particular instance. When determining whether the right of privacy protects an activity, the issue is the importance of that activity under our system
of government. When evaluating a claimed violation of substantive due process inquiry
is focused on the social effects of the activity. See notes 30, 40, 52 supra and accompanying text.
Even though the arguments are distinct, confusion of privacy and substantive due
process is understandable since both attack legislative authority to regulate an activity.
Henkin suggests a reason for this similarity; he argues that the right of privacy developed as an imperfect substitute for substantive due process, as the latter was abandoned
by the Supreme Court. Henkin, supra note 15, at 1419.
The functional similarity of the arguments is seen when modern privacy decisions
are compared with older cases which held that it was beyond the inherent limitations
of the police power to prohibit possession of alcohol for individual use:
[T]he question of what a man will drink, or eat, or own, provided the rights
of others are not invaded, is one which addresses itself alone to the will of
the citizen. It is not within the competency of government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone
is concerned ....
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 501, 117 S.W. 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1909). The
reasoning and result are virtually indistinguishable from an application of locus-related
privacy; the protection offered by both theories is overcome if an act is shown to have
a significant impact on the public welfare. These cases would not reach the same result
today because the requirement of a significant impact has been all but eliminated by
the presumption of constitutionality given statutes attacked as violative of substantive
due process. See text accompanying notes 44 and 52 supra; note 72 infra.
The identity of the arguments is asserted by authorities who argue that Roe represents a misapplication of substantive due process, because it shifted the burden of proof
to the state in a case where the Constitution did not require it. Thus, in their view
Roe can only be interpreted as improperly holding that first trimester abortions do not
sufficiently affect the public welfare to be proper objects of regulation. Ely, The Wages
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Other courts which distinguish the right of privacy and the police
power arguments have uniformly rejected the contention that the use
and possession of marijuana is protected as an aspect of autonomyrelated privacy. In reaching this result, these courts did little more than
repeat the Supreme Court's privacy tests in the negative. In Commonwealth v. Leis62 the court applied the Griswold test and anticipated Roe:
No such right [to smoke marijuana] exists. It is not specifically preserved by either Constitution. The right to smoke
marijuana is not . . . "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty". . . . It is not within a "zone of
privacy" formed by "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments and the Ninth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. . . The defendants
have no right, fundamental or otherwise, to become intoxicated by means of the smoking of marijuana." 3
In State v. Kantner"I the court, fearful of becoming a "super-legislature,"
found that the right to smoke marijuana was not fundamental under
Griswold because it was not "essential . . . for the exercise of the
specifically enumerated rights."65
One case has held that a general right-to-privacy amendment to a
state constitution did not protect possession and use of marijuana. In
Baker v. State,6 6 defendants appealing their conviction for possession of
less than an ounce of marijuana argued, inter alia, that they had a right
to smoke marijuana under Roe, Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird,6 7 and the
privacy amendment to the Hawaii constitution."" Griswold and Eisenstadt were found inapplicable since "the [contraceptive] statutes struck
down had as their object the dictating of the lifestyle of the individual,
not the prevention of harm."8' 9 Apparently Roe was also distinguished
on its facts; the case's holding was summarized but its relation to
marijuana prohibition was not made clear. The right-to-privacy amendment was held to forbid only "unreasonable invasions of privacy" which
bf Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.'. 920, 935-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Or. RFv. 159, 170-85; Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due
Process and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTiNGS L.J. 867, 870-77 (1974).
62. 243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969), affg 3 SUFFOLK L. REv. 23 (Super. Ct. 1968).
63. 243 N.E.2d at 903-04 (citation omitted).
64. 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
65. Id. at -, 493 P.2d at 310 (footnote omitted).
66. - Hawaii -, 535 P.2d 1394 (1975).
67. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy alternate basis for holding prohibition
of nonprofessional distribution of contraceptives unconstitutional).
68. HAwAiI CONST. art. I, § 5.
69. - Hawaii at -, 535 P.2d at 1401.
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did not include the regulation of drugs. In addition, the court found
that the amendment was not intended to create fundamental rights. In
reaching this result the court rejected the rationale of an Alaskan case"0
which held that a similar amendment created a fundamental zone of
privacy protecting the ingestion of food, beverages or other substances. 71
Thus, courts have held that possession and use of marijuana is not in
itself protected as an aspect of autonomy-related privacy because it is
not the sort of activity entitled to the highest constitutional protection.
Regardless of the cogency of the cases' rationales, 72 this result seems
justified under the analysis of the Supreme Court decisions. The right
to use and possess marijuana is clearly less important than the rights
73
protected in those cases.

70. Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alas. 1974). In Gray the Alaska Supreme Court
avoided the question of whether the Federal Constitution's right of privacy protected the
use and possession of marijuana but found that the Alaska constitution's right-to-privacy
amendment did shield the ingestion of marijuana, and remanded the case to determine
whether the state had established a compelling interest justifying the prohibition of marijuana. While the case was on remand Ravin was decided. It is likely that Ravin overruled Gray's extension of autonomy-related privacy. See note 88 infra.
71. Id. at 528.
72. Several cases which refused to find that marijuana possession and use was protected as an aspect of autonomy-related privacy relied on Supreme Court decisions which
validated state statutes prohibiting possession of alcoholic beverages. E.g., People v.
Aguilar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 175, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 904 (Mass. 1969), af'g 3 SUFFoLK L. REv.
23 (Super. Ct. 1968). These cases held that such regulations were necessary incidents
to other valid exercises of the police power, i.e., regulation of the sale of alcohol, and
that "the right to hold intoxicating liquors for personal use is not one of those fundamental privileges. . . which no State may abridge." Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304,
308' (1917).
In spite of the similarity of the prohibition of alcohol to modern marijuana laws,
there are several reasons why the alcohol cases are not strong authority for denying the
privacy claim. First, the issue in those cases was whether the prohibition of mere posession of alcohol was beyond the inherent limitations of the police power; the distinct privacy question was not considered. See note 61 supra. Second, since the two-tiered test
of judicial review had not yet evolved, "fundamental" was not intended to evoke its modem technical connotations. Finally, the necessary-incident-to-other-valid-regulations argument on which the alcohol cases rested has been held by the Supreme Court not to
justify the regulation of an activity protected by the right of privacy. See note 25 supra;
Wallenstein, Marijuana Possession as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, CWM. LAw
BuL. 59, 77-78 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wallenstein].
73. E.g., State v. Kantner, 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306, 310, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
948 (1972). Contra, id. at -, 493 P.2d at 313 (Levinson, J., dissenting); People v.
Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878, 896 (1972) (Kavanagh, J., concurring); Town,
Privacy and the Marijuana Laws, in THE NEW SocIAL DRUG 118 (D. Smith ed. 1970);
Boyko & Rotburg, ConstitutionalObjections to California'sMarijuana PossessionStatute,
14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 773, 791-95 (1967); Oteri & Silvergate, supra note 52, at 67; Wallenstein, supra note 72; Weis & Winner, Pot, Prayer, Politics and Privacy: The Right
to Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 IowA L. REv. 709 (1969); Note, Marijuana Laws: A Need for Reform, 22 Anm. L. REv. 359, 372 (1968); Note, Substantive
Due Process and Felony Treatment for Pot Smokers: The Current Conflict, 2 GA. L.
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The argument that certain aspects of marijuana use and possession
are protected by locus-related privacy has not been accepted in any case

other than Ravin. Most of the courts faced with the issue have uncritically relied on footnote eleven of Stanley,7 4 in which the Court stated that

the decision, ostensibly based in part on freedon of speech, was inapplicable to activities such as possession of narcotics not involving the
reception of information and ideas. Distinguishing Stanley from the
marijuana privacy claim, these courts did little more than quote the
footnote, apparently feeling that nothing more need be said. Only one

court has bothered to formulate the alleged first amendment interest it
was rejecting.

In State v. Renfro7 5 Stanley was found inapplicable to

marijuana because "the Supreme Court has never intimated that freedon
of speech attaches to chemical substances which physically affect the
workings of the brain, or that the ingestion of such substances involves

the reception of 'information or ideas'.

'70

The interpretation of Stanley protection as a hybrid of locus- and

autonomy-related privacy-its existence dependent on both the nature
of the activity protected and the place where it occurs-was made less
defensible by Paris Adult Theatre I.

After Paris Adult Theatre I,

Stanley could also be seen as having protected possession of obscenity

77
solely because it occurred within a zone of autonomy-related privacy.
However, with the exception of Ravin, no court has considered the
second interpretation, even after Paris Adult Theatre I was decided.
Louisiana Affiliate of National Organizationfor Reform of Marijuana

Lmvs v. Guste7 illustrates judicial treatment of the locus-related privacy
challenge.
REV. 247, 252-69 (19668); Note, Marijuanaand the Law: The ConstitutionalChallenges
to Marijuana Laws in Light of the Social Aspects of Marijuana Use, 13 ViLL. L. REv.
851, 861-68 (1968). The following decisions, while holding that there is no fundamental right to sell marijuana or possess it for sale, suggest that a contrary result might obtain in the case of possession for private consumption: United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d
349, 352 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743, 746-47 (D. Conn.
1973); People v. Alexander, 56 Mich. App. 400, 223 N.W.2d 750, 752 (1972).
74. See United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); Louisiana Affiliate of Nat'l Organization for Reform of
Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. La. 1974), affd mem., 511 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 129 (1975); Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 808 (1970); Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886, 204
S.F.2d 597 (1974); State v. Baker, - Hawaii -, 535 P.2d 1394 (1975).
75. - Hawaii -, 542 P.2d 366 (1975).
76. Id. at -, 542 P.2d at 369. But see note 83 infra.
77. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
78. 380 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. La. 1974), affd mem., 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 129 (1975).
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In Guste, the plaintiffs contended that the right of privacy gave one
the right "to do what one wishes in his home and with his own body,"
citing Roe and Stanley for support, and that state and federal laws
prohibiting the possession and use of marijuana should be declared
unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined because there was no
compelling justification for them. The court found that the right claimed
was neither expressly nor implicitly protected by the Constitution:
Plaintiff in the present case bases his claim to privacy on a
far too expansive interpretation of this phrase. .

.

. Although

plaintiff does claim enforcement of this right of privacy
through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment and through
the Ninth Amendment he does not ground it or even attempt
to ground it on any one of the amendments which protect
certain guaranteed rights and which in doing so create constitutionally guarded zones of privacy. The right of plaintiff
to possess marijuana in his own home can under no factual
or legal interpretation be classified as fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.o
In support of its conclusion, the court invoked footnote eleven of Stanley
and a pre-ParisAdult Theatre I case'0 which resolved an attack based
on Stanley in a similar fashion. 81
The correctness of Guste's reliance on footnote eleven to support its
holding that marijuana is not protected under a hybrid theory of privacy
is questionable for several reasons. First of all, it is not clear that
marijuana use is devoid of first amendment interests.8 2 Furthermore,
79. Id. at 406-07.
80. United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, 402 U.S. 939 (1971).
81. The court went on to find that even if there were a fundamental right to possess marijuana it was overcome by the state's compelling interest in prohibiting marijuana use. However, the court did not consider the question properly, since it refused
to balance the individual's and the state's interests or to shift the burden to the state
in any way:
Congress and the state legislature have both found it necessary for general
health and welfare to regulate the use and possession of dangerous drugs. This
court is in no position to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.
380 F. Supp. at 408.
82. Two types of first amendment interests may be involved in the use of marijuana.
First, it could be argued under cases such as Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black armbands as protest against the Vietnam war protected under the first amendment), that marijuana use constitutes symbolic speech because it implicitly expresses a rejection of majoritarian values. State v. Renfro, - Hawai -, 542 P.2d 366, 369 (1975) (rejects the contention that marijuana use involves
the reception of ideas, but suggests that the result would be different if symbolic speech
theory had been alleged); Weis & Wizner, Pot, Prayer, Politics and Privacy: The Right
to Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 IowA L. REv. 709, 718-23 (1969). In
fact, it has been argued that the marijuana controversy resulted from the fact that marl-
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from the other examples given in the footnote, it appears the Court was
referring only to hazardous activities the regulation of which the state
could justify even if a fundamental right were found to be violated. As
cases which decline to include marijuana within the ambit of statutes

prohibiting "narcotics" and Ravin suggest, marijuana is not the sort of a
3
hazardous activity considered in footnote eleven.
The reasoning of Guste is also unpersuasive because the court
failed to treat plaintiff's allegations as raising the issue of whether locusrelated privacy protects marijuana use and possession. If the explanation of Stanley suggested by Paris Adult Theatre I is valid, the right of
privacy in the home is itself a fundamental right. Under this interpreta-

tion the nature of the activity occurring within the zone is relevant only
to the question of whether the state has established an interest sufficient

to justify regulation of the activity. The rationale of Guste is not
inconsistent with a recognition of locus-related privacy. Focusing on
the nature of marijuana use, the cases holding that marijuana use and

possession is in no instance protected by a right of privacy rests on the
implicit assumption that privacy in the home is not a fundamental right.

In several respects Guste is representative of the judicial treatment
of the marijuana prohibition and privacy conflict. By distinguishing the

Supreme Court privacy cases on their facts and refusing to analyze the
bases of the right of privacy, courts, such as the one in Guste, have
summarily decided that marijuana use and possession are not protected

by a fundamental right. While this result may be theoretically proper,
the opinions suggest that the courts were influenced more by the absence

of an express amendment protecting marijuana use than by the inapplicability of the right of privacy. One court 4 reflected this influence when
it voiced its fear of encroaching the legislative domain by creating
juana use connotes different things to different segments of the population. KAPLAN,
supra note 1, at 3; Fms'RT REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Under this view marijuana remains prohibited because it has become a symbol of disorder to the majority and is used
because its illegality makes it a symbol of protest and disaffection with traditional society to others. Symbolic speech has only been protected in public contexts in the Supreme Court cases. But even though minimized in the home, the symbolic aspect of
marijuana use could be held to provide an adequate first amendment interest to trigger
hybrid privacy protection under Stanley.
Second, it could be argued that marijuana use provides new sources of belief and
experience and is protected under the first amendment because it supplies these necessary
preconditions to speech and expression. Town, Privacy and the Marijuana Laws, in ThE
NEw SOcIAL DRUG 118 (D. Smith ed. 1970); Laughlin, LSD-25 and the Other Hallucinogens: A Pre-Reform Proposal,36 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 23, 39-43 (1967).
83. See notes 4 supra & 98 infra and accompanying text.
84. State v. Kantner, 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306, 310, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948
(1972).
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fundamental rights based only on a subjective interpretation of the
Constitution."' Such restraint may be less appropriate than these courts
realize if it engenders a hesitancy to recognize values implicit in the

Constitution but so basic as to be unenumerated.8 6
The failure of cases such as Guste to consider locus-related privacy

is significant since the fear of judicial legislation should be much less
when this type of privacy is involved. In view of the Constitution's
express solicitude of the home, it is likely that courts which consider the

locus-related privacy issue, as did Ravin, will reach a contrary result
to
87
those that have considered the autonomy-related privacy issue.

Thus, before Ravin the marijuana-privacy cases were clouded by
judicial confusion concerning the issues raised and the disjointed development of constitutionally protected privacy. Ravin does not represent
a minority approach inasmuch as it protected private use of marijuana
but rather because it comprehensively considered the issue.
RAVIN V. STATE: MARIJUANA USE AS AN ASPECT OF

LoCUS-RELATED PRIVACY
Ravin was indicted for possession of marijuana. In a motion to
dismiss, he contended, inter alia, that the state violated his right to
privacy under the state and federal constitutions. The district court's
denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed by the superior court and
the Alaska Supreme Court granted review.
Like other cases considering the issue, Ravin rejected the argument
that marijuana use was protected by an autonomy-related right of
privacy under either the Alaska privacy amendment s8 or the Federal

Constitution. As in Leis it reasoned that marijuana use was not implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty: "Few would believe they have been
deprived of something of critical importance if deprived of marijuana
85. See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
86. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics,
53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973).
87. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
88. 537 P.2d at 502. In so holding the court reversed Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524
(Alas. 1974), without comment. In Gray the Alaska Supreme Court held that the right
of privacy amendment "shieldted] the ingestion of food, beverages or other substances"
which included marijuana and that this right of privacy could be restricted only if the
state could establish a compelling justification for doing so. Id. at 528. Relying on
the right to privacy amendment and Gray the two concurring judges suggested that marijuana was protected outside the home as an aspect of autonomy-related privacy. 537
P.2d at 514-15 (Boochever & Connor, JJ., concurring).
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)189 Unlike other cases, Ravin interpreted Stanley through the
lens of the recent obscenity cases. Noting the importance of the home

in the enumerated rights of the Constitution"0 and the special treatment
given the home in state law and tradition9 1 Ravin recognized a locus-

related right of privacy in the home:
The home

.

.

carries with it associations and meanings

which make it particularly important as the situs of privacy.
Privacy in the home is a fundamental
right, under both the
92

federal and Alaska constitutions.
Following language in Stanley, Ravin held that this zone of privacy
included only "purely private, noncommercial" activities. 93 The court

also emphasized that the protection was limited in another sense, finding
that the right would be forced to "yield when an appropriate public need

[was] demonstrated."94 To establish this need Ravin held that the state
would be required to show "a close and substantial relationship between
the public welfare and control of ingestion of marijuana or possession of

it in the home for personal use."'95
In determining whether the state's interests were "close and sub-

stantial" Ravin assumed that "the authority of the state extended only to
activities of the individual which affect others or the public at large." 96

Thus, the state has a valid interest in prohibiting driving under the
influence of marijuana because it affects psychomotor functions. 97 Since,
in the court's view, there was "no firm evidence that marijuana, as
89. 537 P.2d at 502. In order to reach this result the court distinguished Breese
v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1972) on its facts. Breese held a school hair length regulation unconstitutional because it conflicted with the student's right of autonomy-related
privacy. See note 36 supra.
90. U.S. CONST. amends. DI & IV.
91. This court has consistently recognized that the home is constitutionally protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, reasoning that the home itself
retains a protected status under the Fourth Amendment and Alaska's constitution distinct from that of the occupant's person. The privacy amendment to
the Alaska Constitution was intended to give recognition and protection to the
home. Such a reading is consonant with the character of life in Alaska.
537 P.2d at 503-04 (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 504.
93. Id. This phrase may simply be an attempt to define what constitutes a home
giving rise to a locus-related right of privacy. However, the qualification could also be
interpreted as being inconsistent with Ravin's finding that privacy in the home is in itself a fundamental right, since it appears to make the existence of the zone of privacy
dependent on the nature of the activity protected. The only case that has relied on Ravin is consistent with both interpretations. Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206 (Alas. 1975)
(sale of marijuana in public place not protected by the right of privacy).
94. 537 P.2d at 504.
95. 537 P.2d at 511.
96. 537 P.2d at 509. Cf. notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
97. 537 P.2d at 510.
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presently used in this country, is generally a danger to the user or to
others[,] '' 98 the state was held not to have met its burden of proof. As a
result the state of Alaska was foreclosed from regulating possession and
use of marijuana in the home because such regulation impermissibly
violated the right of privacy.

The court was predisposed to invalidate the state's marijuana law,
probably because it regulated individual choice in the absence of a
public need to do so.'

This predisposition was evidenced by the

court's broad interpretation of the right-to-privacy amendment in a prior
case in which the prohibition of marijuana was challenged.' 0 '

The case

may also reflect the same political climate which led the Alaska legislature to make the possession of marijuana a civil crime. 02 Given this
inclination Ravin properly based its holding on locus-related privacy and

the right-to-privacy amendment, and placed an intermediate burden of
justification on the state when a higher standard could have been

required in order to make its result constitutionally palatable.
Courts avoid protecting nonenumerated rights for at least two

reasons. Primarily protection of such-rights is felt to be a violation of
the separation of powers required by the Constitution. Under this view
a court overturning a law when such action is not necessary to protect a
textually demonstrable constitutional interest usurps the policy making
power of the legislature, substituting its beliefs for -the judgment of a
democratically responsive body.'
It has also been suggested that
protection of nonenumerated rights is undesirable for the practical
reason that such decisions tend to weaken the power of the judiciary. 0 4
98. Id. at 508.
99. Ravin's case was remanded to the district court to develop the facts concerning
the circumstances of his possession of marijuana, which did not appear in the trial court
record. While his constitutional attack was successful, Ravin's conviction should be upheld since he was arrested for possession of marijuana while driving a car. N.Y. Times,
May 28, 1975, at 8, col. 4-5; Rolling Stone, July 31, 1975, at 27-28.
100. See id. at 504, 511-12.
We believe this tenet to be basic to a free society. The state cannot impose
its own notions of morality, propriety, or fashion on individuals when the public has no legitimate interest in the affairs of those individuals.
Id. at 509.
101. Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alas. 1974). See notes 70 & 88 supra.
102. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 17.12.110(d)-(e) (1975) (fine not exceeding $100 for public
possession of one ounce or less marijuana).
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Ely, supra note
61. But see note 86 supra and accompanying text.
104. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1048,
1062-63 (1968). Ratner suggests that the executive branch, on which the judiciary is
dependent for the enforcement of its decisions, tends to defer to and enforce decisions
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By basing its result on locus-related privacy Ravin was able to
m ize the problems inherent in protecting nonenumerated rights.
Since the home is an interest clearly protected by the Constitution,' °5 the

opportunity for a court to inject its own values into a decision protecting
the right of privacy in the home is much less than in a case protecting

an interest not enumerated in the Constitution; in the second instance
the existence and the scope of the protection given is determined solely
by ascertaining how fundamental that interest is in the American con-

cept of ordered liberty. Thus, by relying on the locus-related privacy of
the home the court was able to refrain from legislating unjustifiably

while acting as interpreter rather than policymaker.
Assuming the need to ground protection of marijuana use in the
home in enumerated constitutional interests, the significance of Ravin's
reliance on the state right-to-privacy amendment becomes clear. While
the Federal Constitution provided a sufficient foundation for the deci-

sion, reliance on the state amendment broadened the case's constitutional base. Even though the language of the amendment is unspecific and
° it does indicate that the Alaska
does not mention privacy in the home, 06
constitution requires special consideration of private matters. Thus,
while any constitutional protection given marijuana use in other jurisdictions will probably be done under the theory of locus-related privacy

of the home, the presence of a privacy amendment, even though corro-

10 7
borative, will be inessential to such protection.
In addition to its reliance on the privacy amendment, the Ravin

court also used an intermediate burden of proof in an attempt to

diminish the decision's potential for judicial fiat; 08 by avoiding the
based on enumerated constitkitional rights and values. Conversely, decisions protecting
nonenumerated values tend not to be enforced and weaken the judicial branch by eroding
deference to other decisions.
105. See U.S. CONST. amends. I & IV. There is also historical evidence that privacy in the home was considered to be a right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
at the time the Constitution was drafted and was thus intended to be one of the nonenumerated rights "retained by the people" through the ninth amendment. See D. FLARHERTY, PRIvAcY iN COLONiAL NEw ENGLAND 85-88 (1972).

See also note 13 supra and

accompanying text.
106. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."
107. Cf. note 71 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. It is unclear whether the court
intended to apply a rationality in fact or a balancing test. Compare:
Here, mere scientific doubts will not suffice. The state must demonstrate a
need based on proof that the public health or welfare will in fact suffer if the
controls are not applied.
537 P.2d at 511 (majority opinion) (emphasis added), with:
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compelling interest test the court attempted to give the state a reasonable
opportunity to justify its regulation of marijuana. In spite of the court's
language, it could be argued that the compelling interest test was in fact
applied, since the court found that privacy in the home was a fundamental right and none of the state's justifications were sufficient to regulate
privacy within that zone. Even so a more plausible conclusion is that
the court's holding reflected more the nature of the regulation overcome
than the identity of the frameworks of review. It is very likely that in
cases where an infringement of the right of privacy is recognized the
withdrawal of the presumption of constitutionality from legislation is the
significant aspect of any standard of proof applied in evaluating that
infringement." 9 Regardless of which burden of proof was applied, the
cogency of the Ravin court's evaluation of the state's interests remains
intact; if the state was unable to meet an intermediate burden of
justification, clearly it would have been unable to meet the more strict
standard applied in the Supreme Court privacy cases. Thus, Ravin is
precedent for later courts applying either standard of review.
Ravin's reliance on locus-related privacy was constitutionally sound
and politically wise. Application of the case's rationale to other drugs
and activities will not crack the shield of the law, leaving society less
able to protect itself from real dangers. The right of privacy recognized
in Ravin should instead provide a framework for determining what
activities do present real dangers to society and when in other instances
the legal shield is used improperly.
Bruce Brashear
I would apply a single flexible test dependent first upon the importance of the
right involved. . . . I agree with the majority opinion that interference with
rights of privacy within one's home requires a very high level of justification.
Id. at 515 (Boochever & Connor, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
109. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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